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Stability Operations: A Guiding Framework 
for "Small Wars" and Other Conflicts of the 
Twenty-First Century? 
Kenneth Watkin* 
{IJf intemationallaw is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law 
of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of intema-
tionallaw. J 
Introduction 
The ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan provides a stark example of the challenging and complex operating environment in which the international 
community is seeking to establish and maintain the rule oflaw. Professor Hersch 
Lauterpacht's entreaty in the aftermath of World War II for lawyers to address the 
myriad oflaw of war issues not covered by the Geneva Conventions with a feeling 
of humility is no less applicable today regarding attempts to regulate contempo-
rary confli ct. 2 Twenty-fiest-century conflict rarely meets the traditional legal crite-
ria of an international armed conflict. Instead, operational lawyers have to apply a 
normative framework primarily designed to regulate State-on-State conflict to in-
creasingly complex securi ty situations involving warfare both within States and 
across international borders. Such operations range from relatively benign 
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humanitarian relief operations to significant combat operations, such as those in 
Afghanistan involving the multinational forces assisting the Afghan government. 
Lawyers should not feel isolated in this endeavor, as the challenge of categoriz-
ing conflict and operating in complex securi ty situations is not a uniquely legal 
one. Military commanders are also seeking to have doctrine adapted, and where 
necessary developed, to address such conflicts. The doctrinal goal of attempting to 
categorize operations that do not fit within the classic notions of offensive or de-
fensive operations between State armed forces has led to the development of the 
concept of "stability operations." This artide explores the relationship between the 
law of armed conflict and what is largely a US-led initiative to place a myriad of 
military missions, often occurring at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, under 
one overarching doct rinal umbrella.3 The analysis includes an outline of the limits 
of the contemporary normative legal framework in governing operations designed 
to bring stability to failed or failing States. 
Stability operations will be assessed in four parts, commencing with an outline 
of the definition, scope and purpose of those operations. A key question is the de-
gree to which such operations are actually new or whether the concept is in reality a 
catch-all term for a variety of missions that have always challenged both doctrine 
writers and lawyers alike. Secondly, the law governing operations at the lower end 
of the conflict spectrum will be explored. Emphasis will be placed on looking at 
whether international law has adapted to account for such conflict, or ifit has, like 
military doctrine, focused on State-on-State conflict. Thirdly, the applicability of 
the term "stability operations" in a coalition environment will be explored. Given 
the prevalence of such operations, the adoption, or lack thereof, of this doctrinal 
approach by potential allies provides an important indicator of the maturity and 
potential viability of the concept. 
Finally, potential limitations on this forward-thinking American doctrinal ap-
proach to addressing the contemporary "war amongst the people'" will be consid-
ered. While there is a possibility for failure, the significant potential this new 
categorization of conflict presents in seeking to articulate a realistic regime in 
which to conduct operations in the existing complex securi ty environment will be 
explored. 
Stability Operations 
The Doctrine 
The analysis will now turn to outlining the stabili ty operations doctrine, exploring 
its scope and relationship with doctrine governing combat operations, and situat-
ing stability operations in a historical context regarding previous efforts to 
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categorize such conflict. "Stability operations" is a relatively recent doctrine devel-
oped by the prolific US military doctrine production process. In its simplest form, 
such operations are defined as "[ m ]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across 
the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and 
regions."s This defmition, found in Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 
3000.05, elevates such operations to "a core U.S. military mission that the Depart-
ment of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given pri-
ority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated 
across all DoD activities .. .. "6 The goal of these operations is ambitious: 
The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore 
essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long term goal is to help develop 
indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of 
law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society? 
Among the activities envisaged are rebuilding indigenous security forces, correc-
tional facilities and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environ-
ment; reviving or building the private sector; and developing representative 
governmental institutions.8 The partners for US military forces include "U.S. 
Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global 
and regional international organizations ... U.S. and foreign nongovernmental 
organizations ... and private sector individuals and for-pro fit companies . .. . "'1 
While the directive clearly anticipates that many stability operations are best per-
formed by indigenous, foreign or US civilian professionals it clearly, and perhaps 
for many military planners ominously, states: "[ nJonetheless, U.S. military forces 
shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when 
civilians cannot do so. "10 
The fulfillment of the "stability operations" mission presents a significant chal-
lenge. Indeed some might think it at best aspirational ifit were not for the fact such 
operations comprise the types of missions presently being conducted, not just by 
the US military, but also by the wider international community. This is evident not 
only in Iraq, which is often cited as the most glaring example of what can go wrong 
when mission planning has not fully contemplated or provided for the mainte-
nance of order and the re-establishment of governance institutions when tradi-
tional fighting has concluded, but also in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, NATO, the 
United Nations, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations 
are all faced with the tremendous security, governance and organizational chal-
lenges of trying to rebuild or, perhaps more accurately, build a State. Both the Af-
ghanistan and Iraq missions provide clear examples of the activities stabili ty 
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operations can encompass, as well as the policy and legal challenges they pose. 
Given the post-2001 emergence of the doctrine they appear to have been primary 
catalysts for its development. 
However, there is a significant danger in looking at stability operations through 
the narrow lens of Iraq or Afghanistan. The activities captured under the stability 
operations doctrine are much broader than those two major conflicts. This idea is 
reflected in the foreword to the 2008 US Army Fie1d Manual on "Stability Opera-
tions," where Lieutenant General William Caldwell notes. "America's fu ture 
abroad is unlike1y to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq."ll It is the very b readth of the 
stability operations doctrine that highlights not only the complex nature of the ex-
isting security challenge. but also the deficiencies in the underlying legal frame-
work within which contemporary security operations take place. 
The "Catch-All" of Conflict 
The complexity of stability operations results from a number of factors. including 
the wide scope of activities that fall within its definition. To fully understand that 
scope it is necessary to look at recent US Army doctrine. That doctrine has under-
gone a significant revision with the 2008 Army manual replacing an earlier version 
produced just in 2003.12 The speed with which this doctrine has undergone that re-
vision appears to reflect not only the dynamic environment within which such op-
erations are conducted, but also the impact of "lessons learned" information being 
incorporated into military doctrine. 
While not as specific as its predecessor in terms of identifying types of opera-
tions, the new doctrine indicates that stability operations occur across a spectrum 
of conflict from peace to general war and can include 
a wide range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational 
environments---
To support a partner nation during peacetime military engagement. 
After a natural or man-made disaster as part of a humanitarian-based limited 
intervention. 
During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements. 
To support a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare. 
During major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict 
activities. 
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• In a post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized 
hostilities. J3 
Consistent with the 2003 version, the doctrine found in the 2008 manual envis-
ages stability operations to be carried out during humanitarian disaster relief, 
peacetime support to other nations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, coun-
terinsurgency (COIN) operations and post-conflict occupation. Given the general 
wording provided in the new doctrine there is no reason to believe it wouJd not also 
include operations identified in the earlier manual, such as support to counterdrug 
operations, combating terrorism and noncombatant evacuation operations. 14 
Significantly, in respect to terrorism, the 2008 doctrine notes that the greatest 
threat to American national security "comes not in the form of terrorism or ambi-
tious powers, but from fragile states."IS While terrorism remains a threat which 
must be addressed in the context of such operations, avoiding the impression of 
engagement in a "Global Waron Terror" will undoubtedly remove a potential irri-
tant with many coalition partners. The reference to humanitarian operations also 
highlights the degree to which dealing with humanitarian disaster is increasingly 
being seen in the same light as insurgency and other challenges to governance by 
State authorities.16 Both humanitarian and many other types of stability opera-
tions, which are located well down on the conflict spectrum, often involve military 
forces in issues related to governance, including law enforcement. What remains to 
be seen is the degree to which military forces can or must adapt their operations to 
participate in a law enforcement role. 
Significantly, the stability operations doctrine takes a bold step in addressing the 
primary security challenge of the twenty-first century by elevating such operations 
in 000 Directive 3000.05 to an equal footing with combat operations. In many 
ways this doctrine is revolutionary, visionary and long overdue. The Army manual 
seeks to reinforce this doctrinal advance by indicating the full spectrum of opera-
tions includes "continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, 
and stability tasks. "11 That relationship is depicted as follows:l s 
OFFENS!; ,,~ 
DEFENSE OFFENSE DEfENSE STABILITY DEFENSE STABIUTY 
STABll]TY 
THE M ISSION DETERMINES THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF EFFORT AMONG THE COMf>ONENTS 
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The question remains, however, whether the attempt to elevate stability opera-
tions to the level of combat operations will win out over the significant historical 
resistance to changing the focus on traditional "inter-State" armed conflict. To do 
so, such a change in status will have to address the significant effort that will be re-
quired in terms of training and education. The challenges that arise from focusing 
on armed conflict between States not only has plagued doctrine writers, but has 
also impacted on attempts to clearly outline the legal framework governing opera-
tions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. 
A Doctrinal Morass 
The strength of military doctrine is that it provides an overall conceptual frame-
work within which operations are conducted. One of the potential obstacles to 
gaining acceptance for the new doctrinal term "stabili ty operations" is that it could 
appear to a cynical observer to simply be an attempt to provide a new name to an 
old problem. For well over a century efforts have been made to categorize small-
scale and lower-intensity conflict. Such terms have included small wars,1 9 impe-
rial policing,2o police action,21 insurgency, low intensity conflict,22 military oper-
ations other than warp peacekeeping,24 peace enforcement,25 three block wars,26 
revolutionary war, irregular warfare, war amongst the people and, more recently, 
mosaic warY 
These categorizations can often be used to encompass one or more of the other 
doctrinal terms associated with conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. 
For example, the 2007 US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual 
notes that "insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been 
called revolutionary war or internal war."28 Further, they are "included within a 
broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare."29 
The development and use of the term "mosaic war" in the counterinsurgency 
manual30 itself highlights the challenge of seeking just one term to categorize con-
temporary complex security operations. "Mosaic war" was introduced to highlight 
that contemporary COIN operations are more complicated than the 1990s concept of 
"three block war" on the basis that such warfare "is diffioot for counter-insurgents to 
envision as a coherent whole.")l The manual recognizes the term "stability opera-
tions" and identifies it as an essential component of COIN operations, along with 
offensive and defensive operations.32 It is within this shifting doctrinal framework 
that stability operations will have to be interpreted. 
The counterinsurgency manual also highlights a further complexity of con-
temporary conilict. In that manual "insurgency" is defined as "an organized, pro-
tracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy 
of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while 
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increasing insurgent control. "33 Counterinsurgency operations and as a result sta-
bility operations occur not only during internal armed conflicts, but also during 
periods of occupation. 
Part of the challenge in applying the doctrinal term "stability operations" is that 
the underlying security situations which motivated its creation are not only not 
new, but have been and are the dominant form of warfare. As has been identified 
by Doctor Lawrence Yates for the Combat Studies Institute Press, "[ iJf America's 
armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two 
centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military 
undertakings that would today be characterized as stabili ty operations."34 It has 
been noted that in 2006 no State-sponsored opposing armies were engaged in 
armed conflict, while the number of civil wars increased.3s 
Although the potential for armed conflict between States continues, as was evi-
denced by the 2008 armed conflict between the armed forces of Russia and Geor-
gia, there is increasing recognition within the US Department of Defense that "the 
main threat faced by the U.S. military overseas will be a complex hybrid of conven-
tional and unconventional conflicts, waged by 'militias, insurgent groups, other 
non-State actors and Third World militaries.'''36 It is within this complex security 
environment that the applicable law must be identified and applied in order to en-
sure that military operations, including stability operations, are conducted pursu-
ant to the "rule oflaw." 
The Law 
Unfortunately, it appears that international law has been no more successful than 
military doctrine in definitively addressing the challenges associated with irregu-
lar warfare. Like military doctrine, the law of armed conflict has been more 
readily developed and applied to regulate conflict at the inter-State level. The lack 
of a comprehensive set of legal rules governing conflict outside the context of 
traditional inter-State warfare has been infl uenced by a number of interrelated 
factors: the post-World War II emphasis on prescribing the recourse to war be-
tween States, difficulty in categorizing conflict at the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum and a general reluctance to introduce international law of armed con-
flict rules to what are often viewed as internal security matters. This in turn results 
in considerable debate regarding what legal regime governs such conflict: the law 
of armed conflict or human rights law. The analysis will now turn to discussing 
this challenge. 
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Emphasis on Inter-State Conflict 
While the immediate post-World War II period saw the almost concurrent devel-
opment of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,37 governing aspects of the conduct of 
warfare, particular legal emphasis was placed on stopping or limiting future inter-
State wars. This was perhaps best evidenced by the increasing use of the terms jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, which were designed to separate the legal analysis regard-
ing conflict into two distinct analytical spheres.38 The jus ad bellum branch focused 
on the replacement of the balance of power approach to inter-State relations with 
resurgence of the concept of bellum justum. 39 This is rel1ected in the UN Charter, 
which significantly prescribed the recourse to war. 40 
The extent to which war between States was to be limited is reflected in the fact 
that the very use of the term "war" has become problematic. While "war" contin-
ues as part of the everyday lexicon, including in the newly issued stability opera-
tions doctrine manual,4] in a legal sense it has often been viewed since World War 
II as being "outlawed."·2 This sensitivity toward describing conflict as "war" is fre-
quently reflected in legal articles where that term is often prefaced with the quali-
fier that it is being used in a de facto rather than a de jure sense.H 
Even the new term "armed conflict," introduced in the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions to describe a broad range of conflicts between States,'" came with limitations 
that reflected the inter-State bias of the drafters of those Conventions. The scope of 
"armed conflict" is effectively qualified in Common Article 3 of the Conventions 
with reference to "armed conflict not of an international character," mirroring the 
historic approach of distinguishing between public and private war. States were 
more willing to deal with international armed conflict than comprehensively iden-
tify rules to govern its non-international counterpart. In effect, there was signifi-
cant armed conflict in terms of scope, frequency and levels of violence to which the 
rules governing conflict between States were not dearly stated to be applicable. 
This emphasis by the international community on inter-State conflict is under-
standable given the horrific human and material cost of the total wars of the twen-
tieth century. However, the bias toward inter-State conflict has resulted in intra-
State conflict not being provided as clear or rigorous a governing legal framework. 
It is evident there has been an extreme reluctance on the part of States to codify 
the law governing armed conflict as it applies to warfare within a State. Certainly, 
the expansion of Additional ProtocoI l4S to deal with "national liberation move-
ments" and what otherwise would be an internal armed conflict has met with sig-
nificant resistance. Efforts commenced by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (JCRe) as early as 1912 to introduce law of armed conflict norms to internal 
conflict continued through the immediate post-World War II period to the pres-
ent day with what realistically can only be described as having had limited success. 
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, while representing a significant 
milestone in the twentieth-century efforts to codify the rules governing internal 
conflict, in reality represents the best that could be attained in a broader effort to 
have all of the Conventions apply to conflicts "not of an international character. "46 
A quarter century later the success in negotiating Additional Protocol II47 is tem-
pered by both the lack of universal acceptance by States48 and the relatively high 
threshold for its application that leaves significant internal conflict outside its 
scope.49 Notwithstanding a trend in having law of armed conflict treaties address 
both international and non-international armed conilict50 it undoubtedly was the 
long-standing reluctance by States to outline in codified fo rm the rules to be ap-
plied to internal armed conflict which has resulted in efforts by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)51 and the ICRC to articulate 
what customary international law rules should apply to govern internal warfare.52 
These initial efforts are long overdue. However, there remains a lack of agreement 
regarding the scope and content of the customary law of armed conflict as it applies 
to non-international armed conflicts. 
One example of the degree to which international law often focuses on inter-
State conflict is reflected in Legal Conseqllences of the Comtmction of a Wall in the 
Occllpied Palestinian TerritoryP where the International Court of lust ice ruled the 
invocation of Article 51 of the UN Charter required attacks that were imputable to 
a foreign State and a threat originating outside of occupied territory.S4 Even where 
there is a dash between State armed fo rces the jlls ad bellllm focus on limiting con-
fli ct has left considerable room for disagreement and, as a result, confusion as to 
when such clashes engage the law of armed conflict. This is evident in the assess-
ment of the threshold of what constitutes an "armed attack."55 The reference in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and agaimt Nicaraglla56 to "frontier inci-
dents" as a less grave use offorce not constituting such an attack raises the question 
as to whether such incidents could constitute "armed conflict" where the law of 
armed conflict would apply. 
The ICfY has stated armed conflict "exists whenever there is resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authori-
ties and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. "57 In that 
assessment, particular attention is paid to the intensity of the fighting and the orga-
nization of the armed groups.$8 However, the requirement for "protracted" armed 
violence between opposing armed forces still results in situations where armed 
forces may be engaged in fighting where it is not clear there is consensus that 
"armed conflict" exists such that the law of armed conflict would apply. If that is 
the case, it is not necessarily evident how the alternative legal framework of inter-
national human rights law is equipped to regulate such violence. The cri teria 
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established by the ICTY can be contrasted with that followed in Abella v. Argentina, 
where an isolated act of armed violence between State armed forces and a rebel 
armed group during a two-day period resulted in the application of the law of 
armed conflict.59 
While the Nicaragua judgment has garnered considerable criticism, it highlights 
that in the context of the inter-State use of force and in respect to military action 
between State and non-State actors there is a wide range of activity that does not 
neatly fall within the parameters of traditional armed conflict. Such contemporary 
operations can include peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, hostage rescue, 
humanitarian intervention and attacks against terrorist groups. These types of op-
erations fall within the scope of stability operations. Yet this is an area which has 
not garnered sufficient attention in terms of clearly identifying the law which ap-
plies to the conduct of those operations. 
Identification of the applicable law can be further clouded by references to "polic-
ing" language when describing the types of operations. For example, referring to UN 
military operations as "police actions" or counterterrorist operations as "extra-
territorial law enforcement"6/) does not mean such military activity is governed by a 
law enforcement legal framework. Those military operations would, to the extent 
they involve combat, be governed by the law of armed conflict regardless of 
whether such fighting is called a "war."61 
Providing Clarity: Which Nonns Apply? 
The degree of uncertainty regarding what law applies to the wide range of interna-
tional military operations falling within the scope of stability operations should 
raise significant concern. Whether perceived as a "gap" that must be filled , or sim-
ply a grey zone that must be clarified, the reality is that there is no clear interna-
tional consensus as to what law applies to a wide range of international operations 
involving the use, or potential use, of armed force by State armed forces. 
It is a problem often addressed by reference to the "spirit and principles" of the 
law of armed conflict62 or to applying that law to all military operations as a matter 
of direction from national authorities.63 While strong policy statements or national 
direction provides an important indication that the law of armed conflict should 
apply to operations outside the scope of traditional anned conflict, there is consid-
erable room for confusion and debate, particularly in light of the continued appli-
cation of human rights during armed conflict.64 
The confusion results, in part, because of the complexity of such operations. 
Further, the requirement to interface with the civilian population during the con-
duct of many stability operations can significantly impact on the freedom to use 
force. For example, in terms of controlling the use of force the question will 
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inevitably arise as to whether military forces are using force in a combat or law en-
forcement role. At some point the law of armed conflict as a lex specialis must be 
reconciled with the application of the norms associated with a human rights-based 
law enforcement framework. It is not completely clear how such reconciliation can 
occur if the law of armed conflict is only accepted as applying as a matter of policy 
or national direction. 
The breadth of the potential tasks assigned to military forces under the stability 
operations doctrine also introduces other significant challenges. The rule of law 
tasks inherent in stability operations require an understanding oflegal norms and 
standards well beyond a simple familiarity with the law of armed conflict. There 
has been significant debate regarding the impact of human rights norms during pe-
riods of occupation6S and even a lack of consensus of what constitutes an occupa-
tion at law.66 This can result in a potential broadening of situations in which the 
interface between occupation law and human rights may have to be considered. 
To the extent the stability operations doctrine encompasses periods of occupa-
tion, that debate will continue to have relevance. However, the law of armed con-
fli ct and human rights interface might be seen to be less relevant to stability 
operations outside the context of occupation, although questions will continue to 
arise as to the impact of Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II or customary 
international law on human rights law during internal armed conflicts.67 The abil-
ity to interpret and apply international human rights and host-nation laws will 
raise significant challenges fo r military commanders and their legal advisers, who 
likely will be more comfortable applying the law applicable to armed conflict. 
Is it War or Policing? 
A particular challenge for military forces is that stability operations are usually con-
ducted among the people.68 This interface often places those forces in the difficult 
situation of policing the local population in addition to fighting organized armed 
groups. This occurs regardless of whether those forces are operating under the legal 
framework of occupation during an international armed conflict or in respect to a 
multinational coalition effort engaged in combating the counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan. 
Perhaps the most graphic evidence of the unwillingness or inability of the inter-
national community to deal directly with this challenge is that neither the responsi-
bility for, nor the conduct of, a policing function is directly addressed in the black-
letter law governing occupation.69 Perhaps the closest reference can be found in 
Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations,70 which provides that the occupying 
power "shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
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possible, public order and safety [civil life J, while respecting, unless absolutely pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country."71 
The reality is that where a military force controls territory and comes in contact 
with the local population it may, particularly where the failing State is unable to do 
so, be required to perform a policing role. This occurs regardless of whether the 
force is operating on behalf of an occupying power, as part of a multinational coali-
tion or at the invitation of a failing State. Reference to this policing task is found in 
FM 3-07 (2008), where it is noted that "[n]ormally the responsibility for establish-
ing civil security tasks belongs to the military from the outset of operations through 
transition, when host-nation security and police forces assume this role."72 This 
policing task can be problematic for two reasons. First, military forces may be neither 
trained nor equipped to perform a policing function. Secondly, performance of a 
policing function concurrently with ongoing operations against insurgent forces 
can create a complex and, at times, unclear interface between the law of armed con-
flict and the human rights-based norms governing policing.73 
At this stage the international community is just coming to terms with how 
force should be regulated at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. One approach 
adopted by the Israeli High Court of Justice in the Targeted Killing decision?4 is a 
blended one based, in part, on Israeli "internal law" being applied in a law-of-
armed-conflict targeting analysis which has a preference for "[aJerest, investiga-
tion, and tria!."?5 Here the domestic law requirements reflect the law enforcement 
norms of international human rights law in favoring capture over killing. An alter-
native approach is a "situation based" one which looks at the type of threat and 
then applies the appropriate legal regime to control the use of force by security 
forces. This means the law of armed conflict is applied to incidents of violence re-
lated to the armed conflict, while human rights-based law enforcement standards 
are applicable to policing scenarios.76 
Whichever approach is applied, there are significant doctrine, training and op-
erational deployment challenges for military forces. The question is not necessarily 
one of "targeting" or deciding when someone is taking a direct part in hostilities. 
For soldiers manning checkpoints or defending convoys against suicide bombers 
or improvised explosive devices their reaction will often be governed by self-defense 
rules. The inevitable restriction on the use of fo rce in counterinsurgency opera-
tions points to an application of graduated minimum force not normally associ-
ated with anned conflict. The challenge of reacting to such threats is not helped by 
the present lack of clarity in the law, particularly in light of the decisions being 
asked of young coalition and International Security Assistance Force soldiers oper-
ating in complex security situations such as Afghanistan. 
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The United States and Coalition Partners: On the Leading Edge or Alone? 
Having outlined a number of the doctrinal and legal challenges associated with the 
stability operations doctrine. there is also the question of how this US doctrine will 
resonate in a coalition environment. Given the likelihood that the United States 
will continue to conduct operations as the dominant member of international co-
alitions. it is evident that a common understanding among coalition partners of 
what stability operations are will be helpful in ensuring interoperability. Further. 
the military doctrine ofthe United States, as the major State on the international 
stage regarding military capability. is a significant factor in tenns of developing 
customary international law. 
In considering the approach of allied countries toward stability operations. it 
appears that the United States has a much more robust. well-developed and ambi-
tious vision for such operations. For example. the Canadian Forces (CF) have no 
separate stability operations doctrine. although there is doctrine for CF operations 
generally, as well as peace support operations, humanitarian operations. disaster 
relief operations and noncombatant evacuation operations. that would fall under 
the US stability operations doctrine umbrella.77 
As often occurs in situat ions where military forces are confronted with new 
operational challenges. Canadian doctrine appears to be driven by experiences 
gained at the tactical level in Afghanistan. The Canadian Army has developed two 
manuals that refer to stability operations.78 The new doctrine focuses on counter-
insurgency. with stability operations being addressed at the tactical level. Tactical 
activities comprise four parts: offensive. defensive, stability and enabling opera-
tions. thereby setting out "full-spectrum operat ions."79 Stability operations are 
defined as "a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces. often in 
conjunction with other agencies to maintain. restore or establish a climate of or-
der."80 To the extent these manuals reflect the focus of Canadian Forces opera-
tions. it is clear this approach is not as comprehensive as that adopted by the 
United States. 
At this stage NATO does not appear to have embraced stability operations as a 
separate strategic- or operational-level concept. It is perhaps telling that the 2006 
NATO Handbook refers to the Afghanistan mission as an international peacekeep-
ing effort.81 One of the factors that may impact on a wider allied adoption of the 
term "stability operations" is found in the indication that part of the rationale for 
the US development of a separate stability operations doctrine may be the negat ive 
connotation attached to "peace operations." As is noted in a 2006 Congressional 
Research Service Issue Brief for Congress. "[p leacekeeping has been the traditional 
generic term .... More recently. in an attempt to capture their ambiguity and 
423 
A Guiding Framework/or "Small Wars" and Other Conflicts 
complexity, and perhaps to avoid the stigma of failure attached to peacekeeping, 
they have become known as 'stabilization and reconstruction' operations, or more 
simply 'stabili ty' operations."82 
As a result, there may be a number of factors that may impact on the degree to 
which coalition partners embrace the US concept of stability operations. First, 
peacekeeping and other peace support operations do not necessarily have the same 
negative connotation outside the United States. Therefore, it may not necessarily 
be evident to other States why a new term is required. Second, the very "ambiguity 
and complexity" of such operations may cause other military forces to embrace 
more narrowly focused mission-specific doctrine. Third , other nations may nei-
ther be involved, nor plan to get involved, in as wide a variety of stability operations 
as the US doctrine appears to cover. Accordingly, potential coalition partners may 
continue to use separate doctrinal terms such as peace support operations or hu-
manitarian operations. Finally, the traditional approach of State militaries in fo-
cusing on State-versus-State conflict may still be prevalent among the potential 
allies of the United States. This in turn may limit any acceptance that stability oper-
ations have an equal status with traditionaJ combat operations. None of these fac-
tors will necessarily preclude the conduct of coalition operations within the wider 
stability operations doctrine. However, it may mean that the US military will have 
to be prepared to interface with coalition partners on a different level (e.g., tactical) 
and with terms that reflect only a partial acceptance by other States of 
subcomponents of the overarching stability operations doctrine. 
The Future 
The question remains as to whether this new doctrine is simply the latest attempt in 
a long history of short-lived efforts to definitively categorize unconventional con-
fli ct. While it is likely an answer to that question will only be provided with the pas-
sage of time, it is clear the US military has taken a significant step in creating the 
stability operations doctrine. It is an approach which seeks to break the historical 
reluctance to address warfare outside of State-versus-State conflict. Combined 
with other publicat ions such as the counterinsurgency manuaJ and the Rule of Law 
Handbook: A Practitioner's Guide for Judge Advocates, g, there is evidence significant 
effort continues to be placed on developing doctrine and guidance that specifically 
addresses unique aspects of counterinsurgency operations, the dominant form of 
warfare in the twenty-first century. 
Unfortunately, it does not appear the doctrine can point to a comprehensive, 
clearly articulated legal framework for such operations. Perhaps this is understand-
able given the inability of the international community to definitively come to 
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grips with this challenge. This is graphically evidenced by the continued reliance on 
a "spirit and principles" or national-direction approach to applying the law of 
armed conflict to operations conducted at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. 
However, until d ear direction on the legal framework can be provided, there is a 
danger such operations will be conducted at the "vanishing point" of the law of 
armed conflict. In this respect it could be the complexity and ambiguity inherent in 
the scope of stability operations doctrine that sows the seeds of its downfall. 
Yet such an outcome can be avoided. The doctrine itself is visionary in that it 
shines a spotlight on the very type of operations that dominate the international 
scene today. Given the number, scope and complexity of such operations and the 
fact that international intelVention, either under a UN mandate or otherwise, is a 
common occurrence, it may be time for a dear statement by States as to what law of 
armed conflict applies beyond general reference to Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II (ifit applies) or the suggested rules of 
the JCRC customary law study. It may very well be that the credibility of the doc-
trine of "stability operations," which is based upon establishing legitimacy and the 
rule of law, will itself be dependent on such a definitive articulation of customary 
norms. 
As is noted in FM 3-07 (2008), intelVening forces "carry with them an innate 
perception of legitimacy that is further strengthened by consistent performance 
confonning to the standards of national and internationallaw."S4 However, unless 
this new doctrine is matched by an effort by individual States, and by the interna-
tional community generally, to comprehensively outline the law of armed conflict 
that applies to conflict outside the context of inter-State warfare, and articulate 
how that law interfaces with the human rights norms, the ability of armed forces to 
conform with such legal standards may be at risk. 
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